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AUTONOMY AND COMMUNITY IN 
FEMINIST LEGAL THOUGHT 
SUSAN G. KUPFER* 
In discussing the rights of woman, we are to 
consider, first, what belongs to her as an 
individual, in a world of her own, the arbiter 
of her own destiny, ... on a solitary island .... 
The strongest reason for giving ... her the most 
enlarged freedom of thought and action .. .is 
the solitude and personal responsibility of 
her own individual life. 
-Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 18921 
[W]omen have always had to wrestle with 
the knowledge that individualism's presti-
gious models of authoritative subjectivity 
have refused female identification. Fem-
inism, as an ideology, took shape in the con-
text of the great bourgeois and democratic 
revolutionary tradition. It thus owes much 
to the male-formulated ideology of individ-
ualism, as it does to the special experiences 
of women who have been excluded from the 
benefits of individualism. 
-Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, 19912 
In the hundred years between the statements of the two 
Elizabeths, feminist legal thought3 has contributed, in an 
... Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. Thanks to Dean Anthony 
J. Pagano and Professor Judith McKelvey for their professional and personal support. 
I'd also like to acknowledge the superb research assistance of Ghada N. Saliba and the 
work of the students in my Jurisprudence seminars at Golden Gate. Sometimes I won-
der who the teacher is. 
1. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, The Solitude of Self, IN ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, 
SUSAN B. ANTHONY WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 246 (Ellen C. DuBois ed., 1981). 
2. ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 225 (1991). 
3. "Feminism is then the range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated 
first, to describing women's subordination-exploring its nature and extent; dedicat-
ed second, to asking both how-through what mechanisms-and why-for what com-
plex and interwoven reasons-women continue to occupy that position; and dedicated 
third to change." Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of 
Feminist Legal Thought, 3-4 BERK.WOMEN'S L.J. 1,2-3 (1988). 
583 
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explosion of scholarship, to the unpacking and understanding 
of the dichotomies ofWoman/Man, Self/Other, Subject/Object, 
Individual/Community. As an introduction to this issue of 
the Women's Law Forum, I want to explore one particular 
aspect of the discussion, which Duncan Kennedy has called the 
"fundamental contradiction" of liberal thought: that "rela-
tions with others are both necessary to and incompatible with 
our freedom. "4 
Feminist scholarship, unlike critical theory, has not com-
pletely challenged the basic tenets of liberal ideology. While 
the critical view has been to reject the individualism of liber-
al political theory in favor of structural arguments against the 
legitimacy of state power,6 feminist scholarship has started from 
a focus on the position or experience of women as socially gen-
dered. Because historically women have been relegated to 
the private sphere of home and family while subordinated to 
men in the public sphere of work and politics,6 feminist anal-
ysis has developed critiques of both aspects of the dichotomy 
of individual! community. In seeking to remedy gender 
inequality, writers face a dilemma. The possibility of autono-
my for individual women risks subscribing to liberal ideology, 
with its known inequities; yet, the focus on community flirts 
with reductionism, seeing women as only connected to others. 
Robin West articulated the parallel development of the 
opposition of critical theory to classic liberal thought in what. 
she terms 'irretrievably masculine' jurisprudence and con-
trasted it to a jurisprudence based on the SUbjective experience 
ofwomen.1 Liberal theory seeks to protect the individual from 
'annihilation' by oth~rs through the construct of legal rights; 
rights establish boundaries, enforced through law, but have the 
consequence, exposed by critical theory, of contributing to 
alienation and frustrating a desire for connection.8 The iden-
tical themes in feminist jurisprudence, which West calls "the 
state of connection,"9 create different oppositions: cultural 
feminism sees intimacy and connection as its main value and 
4. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 205, 211-13 (1979). 
5. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 9-10 (1987). 
6. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); 
Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1045. 1061-62 (1992). 
7. Robin West. Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
8. 1d. at 4-12. 
9. 1d. at 3. 
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fears separation from others as its harm,IO while radical 
feminism seeks to maximize the integrity of the individual 
woman and views invasion or intrusion of the self (through com-
mitment to children or others) as a primary obstacle to auton-
omy.ll 
Recently public debate has focused on the extreme differ-
ences generated by conflicts in feminist ideology. 12 Within the 
academy, splits between liberaP3, cuituraP4 and radicaP6 fem-
inists demonstrate the strongly diversified approaches to the 
problem while the critique of anti-essentialism has denied 
the view that there can be one coherent voice for feminism. 16 
Outside the ivory walls, the media continues to reinforce cul-
tural stereotypes 'proving' the failure of the feminist vision.17 
The epigraph from Elizabeth Fox-Genovese typifies one 
aspect of the struggle: she argues that concentration by fem-
inists on individualist notions of empowerment is misplaced 
and that it is the surrender to the community which will result 
in a bette,r life for women. IS Robin West would agree: although 
she seems to understand the ideas of radical feminists sup-
porting autonomy, she endorses an essentialist position for 
women as they are defined and connected by the experience, or 
capacity, for mothering. 19 
In Part I, following a brief analysis of the critique of liberal 
political theory, I argue that the theories of Fox-Genovese and 
West deny the felt experience of women in their own struggle 
to counteract the construct of gender; since women are "engen-
dered" by social norms, they must first develop the subjective 
experience of autonomy, in which they seek to understand the 
inner direction of their authentic selves. Second, as I argue in 
10. [d. at 13-28. 
11. [d. at 29-36. 
12. See, e.g., Jane Gallop, Marianne Hirsch, Nancy K. Miller, Criticizing Feminist 
Criticism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 349 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 
1990) (describing personal experiences with criticism); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging 
Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. 
REV. 25 (1990) (lamenting the splintering caused by the debate over essentialism). 
13. See infra text accompanying note 26. 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 30-37 
15. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
16. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN 
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
17. Current examples include those detailed in SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1991). 
18. Fox-GENOVESE, supra note 2, at 33-54. 
19. West, supra note 7. 
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Part II, the idea of community, much bandied about, is a con-
cept which is ill-defined in most feminist thought. Further, the 
prescription for women's place as part of a community gener-
ally ignores the experience of women who traditionally have 
been subordinated by their defined roles within communities. 
While this essay considers a range of written work about 
feminism, there is no unified theory presented in the literature. 
The innovation and energy of the work is based upon contex-
tual expression of various women's experiences20 and it is the 
very point of subjective differences which is valued. This 
might be characterized as a post-modernist view. 21 As Martha 
Minow has explored in an extended work, the emphasis on and 
discussion of difference holds the promise of a thoughtful 
reconsideration of some central ideas of liberal theory: neu-
trality (unpacking the assumptions underlying a certain, objec-
tive norm by which we measure difference) and universality or 
tolerance (valuing, not stigmatizing, the difference).22 
Feminist theorizing starts from the reality of women's var-
ied, contextual experience as a source for examining gender 
inequality.23 While there may be no single voice that speaks for 
Woman,24 gender oppression continues to be both central and 
distinctive to inequality within our society. This does not min-
imize the vast inequities created by race, class or sexual pref-
erence but it does define a different slice of the social, economic 
and legal framework. A survey of the literature demonstrates 
its dazzling diversity: 
Beginning in the late 1960's, the first wave of feminist legal 
thought focused on eradicating the legal differences between the 
genders. 26 The notion of formal equality culminated in the 
20. For an elaboration of this idea, see Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, 
In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990). 
21. Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987). Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, 
Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and 
Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19,35 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990). 
22. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990). 
23. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 lIARv. L. REV. 
821 (1990). 
24. SPELMAN, supra note 16, at 133-59. 
25. For the taxonomies that follow, I have drawn on accounts by Patricia A. Cain, 
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 5-4 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-
90); Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803 (1990); 
Dalton, supra note 3; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
617 (1990). 
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attempt to pass the second Equal Rights Amendment and in the 
development of analyses examining unequal formal distinctions 
in employment, educational opportunities, reproductive free-
dom, pregnancy leave, rape laws and so on.28 These theorists 
worked very much within the existing legal system, seeking to 
use the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and governmental rulings to eliminate gender discrimination. 
The strategy had its limitations after its first few successes.27 
But the next wave of feminist theorists rejected the idea of 
formal gender equality in favor of recognizing and celebrating 
the differences between the genders.28 Some revere the con-
nections that women have to others and to the community.29 
They draw on psychological30, ethicapt, and socioiogicaP2 schol-
arship to inform their theories. They have been dubbed the "dif-
ference voice" feminists, after Carol Gilligan's major work33 or 
the "cultural feminists" in Robin West's analysis. 34 Legal 
scholars have used the distinctive feminist perspective to 
articulate a different vision of law practice35 and legal educa-
tion38, and to further the discussion and analysis of gender 
26. Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of Maternity and 
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Henna Hill Kay, Models of 
Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39; Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the 
Equal Treatment / Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985). 
27. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE L.J. 1373, 1375 (1986). 
28. Cain, Limits of Equality, supra note 25, at 835-38. 
29. See West, supra note 7. 
30. NANCY L. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); JEAN BAKER 
MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (1976); JULIET MITCHELL, 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM (1974). 
31. Drucilla Cornell, probably more of a postmodernist than a cultural feminist, 
nevertheless develops the idea of "femininity" in her ethical work. Drucilla Cornell, 
Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291 
(1985); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 
75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990). 
32. E.g., Barrie Thorne, Children and Gender: Constructions of Difference in 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990). 
33. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Gilligan's work has been 
extremely widely read and utilized. For a good critical commentary on her work, see 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the 
Logic of the Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 120-30 (1991); Joan C. Williams, 
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 840 n.181 (1989). 
34. West, supra note 7. 
35. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, 1 BERK. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 39 (1985). 
36. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies 
and Legal Education or -The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 
(1988). 
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issues.37 This second wave has generated two different cri-
tiques: one which deplores the debate over sameness/difference 
as a useless, divisive conflict in feminist ideology,38 and the 
other which fears the focus on difference will trivialize and 
marginalize women's concerns.39 
Catharine MacKinnon is a radical feminist.40 Her analysis, 
based on Marxist theory of class dominance/subordination, 
also focuses on difference between the sexes. She views gen-
der as socially constructed and believes that men use the dif-
ference of sex to justify unequal power over the class of 
women}! Where the cultural feminists might see difference 
as a product of biological or psychological determination, 
MacKinnon postulates that women are defined by men on the 
basis of their sexuality. Women as a class are defined by men 
according to their difference from men; this leads her to argue 
for special protections for women under law to redress women's 
subordination in the areas of sexual harassment, rape, and 
pornography.42 MacKinnon reduces women to an essential 
characteristic: their sexual "use and abuse by men. "43 
Women of color, building on ideas generated by critical 
race theory," also center their analysis on difference. However, 
they use the fact of difference and the exploration of context to 
argue against a unified theory of feminist thought. Instead, 
they have advanced the thesis of intersectionality45 or anti-
essentialism.46 They attack traditional feminist theory as priv-
ileging only certain (white, middle class, heterosexual) women 
37. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Mary Joe Frug, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis 
of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985); Martha Minow, Foreward: 
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: 
Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 
(1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). 
38. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness / Difference Debate: A Post-Modern 
Path Beyond Essentialism and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J., 296. 
39. Rhode, supra note 25, at 618; Schroeder, supra note 33, at 120. 
40. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
41. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, 40-45. 
42. MACKiNNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapters 6 and 7. 
43. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, at 5. 
44. See generally Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987). 
45. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A 
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. 
46. Harris, supra note 16. 
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while ignoring the concerns of the outsider47or the disadvan-
taged woman. They question whether there can or should be 
a unitary vision of a feminist agenda.48 
More recently, a number of theorists have elaborated upon 
frameworks from European intellectual theory to analyze 
ender issues in the fields of literary theory,49 structuralism, 60 
hermeneutics,Gl and post-modernism.62 Post-modernism, gen-
erally, seeks to undermine the duality of normative discourse, 
to refrain from seeing dichotomies of self/other, man/woman, 
white/outsider, heterosexuallhomosexual, dichotomies which 
not only define through contradiction (e.g. Woman is not Man63) 
but imply a hierarchical advantage of the dominant definer over 
the other.64 Rather, these theorists seek to understand a more 
central conception of the definition which takes aspects of 
both parts of the duality, not quite as a synthesis, but as a re-
creation.66 
Lastly, relying on the centrality of women's subjective 
experience to an explanation and critique of gender inequali-
ty, the unique contribution of feminist theory may well be in the 
development of a methodology to explore gender differences" 
and to articulate the particulars of the gendered experience. 57 
The methodology has the potential of generating true trans-
formation as it substitutes ways of recalling the experience of 
women for society's presumptions about official neutrality 
and universality toward difference." These methods include 
the theory of 'positionality,'69 consciousness raising,eO use of 
47. Id. at 584. 
48. Id. at 585·90. 
49. See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Feminism and Adaptive Heroinism: The 
Paradigm of Portia as a Means of Introduction, 25 TuLSA L.J. 657 (1990). 
50. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Room for Manoeuver: Toward a Theory of 
Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 64 (1989); Ashe, supra note 21. 
51. Schroeder, supra note 33. 
52. Ashe, supra note 21. 
53. This insight is Simone DeBeauvoir's; SIMONE DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 
(1952) 
54. Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, The Uses of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 33 (1988), paraphrasing 
Jacques Derrida: "the interdependence is hierarchical with one term dominant or prior, 
the opposite term subordinate and secondary." Id. at 37. 
55.Id. 
56. Bartlett, supra note 23. 
57. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991) 
(describing the use of narrative in feminist writing). 
58. Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Methods (Book Review), 16 
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991). 
59. Bartlett, supra note 23, at 880·87. 
60. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapter 5. 
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narrative61 and practical reasoning or contextually situated 
analysis.62 Some have suggested that the new methods could 
generate a different view of due legal process.68 
Because of the diversity in the ways that feminist theorists 
understand and use the notion of difference, there is a risk that 
feminist theory will be trivialized by others as incoherent. At 
the core of the feminist struggle are the competing concerns of 
relieving inequality based on gender for individual women 
while appreciating the role of women within the community. 
Feminist legal thought vacillates between supposedly irrec-
onciliable visions of complete equality and autonomy for the 
individual woman (liberal feminist thought) and primary iden-
tification of the woman with the needs of the community, 
most often defined as her family, her commitment to children 
and others (cultural feminist thought). 
But, perhaps these may not be opposed dichotomies.64 The 
strength of women's experience may very well be impulses to 
both: true equality through complete autonomy for every indi-
vidual in society and full participation of the autonomous 
individual within the community. There is no reason that 
autonomous individuals cannot be joined by an interest or 
goal in transformative imaginings of the possibilities of dif-
ference. 66 
1. AUTONOMY IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 
A. BACKGROUND: THE CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 
The radical views of critical legal studies, critical race the-
ory and feminism reject the underpinnings ofliberallegalism. 
Deborah Rhode puts it succinctly: 
61. Abrams, supra note 57. 
62. Minow & Spelman, supra note 20. 
63. Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J. OF LAw & FEMINISM 189 
(1991). 
64. "Ifrelationism seeks to reconcile the self and the other, while respecting the 
otherness of the other, it may be intensely feminist." Schroeder, supra note 33, at 130. 
65. Jennifer Nedelsky's vision of autonomy includes transformative aspects of 
community. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and 
Possibilities, 1 YALE J. OF LAw & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic 
of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 
603 (1986). 
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[L]iberal theorists generally begin from the 
premise that the state's central objective 
lies in individuals' freedom to pursue their 
own objectives to an extent consistent with 
the same freedom for others. Implicit in 
this vision are several assumptions about 
the nature of individuals and the subjectiv-
ity of values. As conventionally presented, 
the liberal state is composed of autonomous, 
rational individuals .... yet, while capable of 
full knowledge of their own preferences, 
these liberal selves lack similar knowledge 
of others. Accordingly, the good society 
remains as neutral as possible about the 
meaning of the good life. 66 
591 
Liberal legal thought protects the individual at the core of 
its ideology in two specific ways: through respect for freedom 
or autonomy and through the idea of equality or universal 
treatment. The individual freely cedes power to the state 
through the idea of the social contract, retaining the freedom 
to live a life which is self-determined. Individualism is pro-
tected in liberal ideology through the idea of rights which pro-
vide a defense of individual perogatives against the threat 
from the community or from government. But, as critics oflib-
eral ideology argue, the claims of liberalism to be "inclusive, 
participatory and egalitarian" are false. 67 Further, reliance on 
legal rights fosters selfish, atomistic, rational actors out to max-
imize their own goals, creating in the process a society which 
is alienating.6s While reliance on state power to enforce rights 
subjects individuals to the indeterminate exercise of power by 
state officials,69 it also privileges those who can take advantage 
of the competitve struggle. The focus on universality in liber-
alism, the critics argue, sublates real, divisive existing 
inequities of class, resources, race and such within the rhetoric 
of theoretical equality. And, while equality is the ideal of 
treating comparably situated individuals in the same way, 
analysis of the realities of daily life demonstrates that the 
true neutrality of the state toward outcomes succeeds only in 
66. Rhode, supra note 25, at 627. 
67. [d. at 628. 
68. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact 
of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); KELMAN, supra note 5, at 63; 
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
69. Tushnet, supra note 68. 
9
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advantaging those already privileged and marginalizing those 
who are disadvantaged.70 
Feminists are uniquely positioned to continue and to add 
to the critique of liberal legalism. "The personal is political" 
has two dimensions: a political view of personhood demon-
strates the deeply engrained domination of the patriarchy in 
women's individuallives;71 at the same time a transformative 
view of the polity is possible from perspectives and values 
held by those in society who do not share the values of the dom-
inant class.72 
We should not abandon the idea of autonomy because it 
bound up with contradictions of liberal legalism. For the 
experience of autonomy can cut both ways. When we describe 
the world we envision, surely we seek the experience of auton-
omy for everyone; it is a goal which recognizes some true val-
ues of humanity, particularly, the honesty of subjective 
self-knowledge and the power of self-determination. Feminists 
have proposed a "reconceived" autonomy73 based on feminist 
principles, a reconception which promotes self-determination. 
Nor need we abandon the aspects of feminist thought which 
envision the place of the truly autonomous person in a com-
munity or legal system reflecting progressive, transformative 
values. The centrality of law in our society as the dominant 
public discourse74 provides a platform for the integration offem-
inist thought into a redefinition of community. 
As others have argued, maybe the problem is that liberal-
ism has not lived up to its full potentia1. 76 But for Catharine 
MacKinnon, along with other critical legal theorists, liberal 
legalism legitimates and perpetuates the existing order and 
domination. She is not led to advocate for a theory of individual 
autonomy since she views the collective class of women as the 
basic referent: 
70. MINOW, supra note 22, at 146-56; Rhode, supra note 25, at 633. 
71. See generally GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986). 
72. This is the main point of "outsider" jurisprudence, which includes feminism 
and critical race theory. See Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple 
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 7 (1989). 
73. Nedelsky, supra note 65. 
74. Martha Fineman describes the relationship of feminist method to the dom-
inant legal discourse in Fineman, supra note 12, at 25-34. 
75. See Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Reply to Professor Colker, 13 
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1990). 
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Liberal feminism takes the individual as 
the proper unit of analysis and measure of 
the destructiveness of sexism. For radical 
feminism, although the person is kept in 
view, the touchstone for analysis and outrage 
is the collective "group called women" 
.... [L]iberal feminism aggregates all women 
out of each woman. Radical feminism sees 
all women in each one .... The relationship 
between the individual and the social delin-
eates a split between liberal and radical 
feminism in their view of the personal. In 
liberal feminism, the personal is distin-
guished from the collective; in radical fem-
inism, it comprises it.76 
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MacKinnon does not believe that an individual woman can 
overcome the position she is allocated in the hierarchy; she 
denies any transformative sense of autonomy. Kathryn Abrams 
points out that MacKinnon's stance has the power to distance 
and alienate women (and others) who still ascribe to a gener-
ally liberal explanation of the state and desire to exercise 
choice in the conduct of their lives. 77 She criticizes the reliance 
on ideological argument because it might deter social change, 
but sees this, perhaps, as MacKinnon's differing strategy for 
remediation.78 
Autonomy should be about empowerment, self-deter-
mination, following an inner direction, freedom.79 Focusing on 
autonomy as a political, philosophical, and even psychological 
construct, the autonomous individual must discover an 
"authentic self." MacKinnon, in contrast, sees a victim, defined 
by men, socially constructed, and either denying the reality of 
her subordination or having false consciousness about the 
extent of her victimization. MacKinnon's argument, fortu-
nately, hasn't dissuaded other feminist theorists from con-
ceptualizing a truly autonomous woman who can transcend the 
problems posed by the liberal framework. 
76. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 40. 
77. Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990). 
But see Schroeder, supra note 33, at 194, n.269, arguing that MacKinnon may view 
lack of autonomy as the root of injustice. 
78. Id. at 779. 
79. For the classical liberal concept of autonomy, note the discussion in JOSEPH 
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, Chapters 14-15 (1986); Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy 
and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1098 (1989). 
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I want to contrast MacKinnon's argument with that of 
Jennifer Nedelsky who proposes a feminist concept of auton-
omy different from the traditional liberal definition. Her def-
inition of autonomy is freedom and capability: "a human 
capacity for making one's own life and self."80 But she sees 
women's experience as providing a grounding in reality: "the 
centrality of relationships in constituting the self."81 This con-
trasts with the liberal definition of autonomy which concerns 
itself with boundaries and with rights to guarantee individu-
al freedom. 82 
Nedelskyexpands her definition of autonomy: "its essen-
tial elements are "the (problematic) notion of self-determina-
tion ... comprehension, confidence, dignity, efficacy, respect and 
some degree of peace and security from oppressive power. "83 In 
addition to the capacity for autonomy, she acknowledges the 
importance of comprehending the subjective experience of 
feeling autonomous. Liberal political theory attempts to sep-
arate the private and public spheres; it is in the private sphere 
that freedom from collective action is celebrated. Critics of the 
liberal tradition have demonstrated the incoherence of the 
public/private distinction and Nedelsky tries to develop a 
vision of autonomy that is not about boundaries but about 
what she calls integration with the collective. "The task is to 
make the interdependence of citizen and state conducive to, 
rather than destructive of, autonomy. "84 In the latter part of 
her argument, Nedelsky illustrates this interdependence by 
positing, for example, the use of procedural due process to 
empower citizens to change from helpless, dependent victims 
of state policy into those with a sense of "dignity, competence 
and power. "85 
MacKinnon, on the other hand, sees the lack of choice or 
autonomy for individual women as an aspect of their collective 
oppression as a group. She defines rights in the negative as a 
boundary protection to freedom of individual action and says 
"no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the 
[oppressed] group will make it the equal of the first [groUp]."86 
She sees women as objects, fundamentally disempowered and 
80. Nedelsky, supra note 65, at 8. 
81. 1d. at 9. 
82. See the discussion in Rhode, supra note 25, at 632-35. 
83. Nedelsky, supra note 65, at 11. 
84. 1d. at 14. 
85. 1d. at 27. 
86. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 164. 
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incapable of true autonomy because they have been socially 
constructed by the dominant class of men. "Women cope with 
objectification by trying to meet the male standard, and mea-
sure their self-worth by the degree to which they succeed."87 
Autonomy, for MacKinnon, is not a virtue. It privileges indi-
vidual women, contributing to their false consciousness of 
oppression and forcing them to emulate the male norm, depriv-
ing the collective class of women of the knowledge and power 
to move for structural change.88 
It is not clear to me why this need necessarily be SO.89 
Critical legal studies theorists join with radical feminists to con-
struct the following syllogism: individualism maximizes the 
selfish, atomistic goals of (male normed) beings, leads to a 
concern for rights which protect the privileges gained against 
the state or the claims of others within the community and 
defeats collective movement for social change.9o Some see 
rights as alienating in themselves, creating a situation where 
there is no possibility of true community.9! To me, there is an 
alternative vision. The goal is true (political, social, econom-
ic) autonomy for each person, regardless of gender, race or 
class. A redefined community consists of those auto- nomous, 
authentic selves who aspire to this vision. To use a rights anal-
ysis to protect and encourage the development of autonomy 
need not result in a static, conservative, protectionist world. 
Pluralist strains in liberal society, rather than standing only 
for the state's neutrality toward the pursuit of individual 
ends, can result in an accomodation of the many, energetic 
visions for the future, a true non-essentialism." 
I next want to discuss how the concept of autonomy can be 
reformulated by feminists without buying into the negatives 
of liberal legalism. I suggest that a true concept of feminism 
which strives for the creation of an "authentic" self will not only 
supply a building block for feminist legal theory but will be the 
basis of a relational theory of authentic selves within a strong 
community. If feminism has transformative goals, recreating 
self-determination will inevitably result in women sharing 
their experience of autonomy. 
87. [d. at 149. 
88. [d. at 124. 
89. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 33, at 193·96. 
90. See the discussion in MINOW, supra note 22, at 164·72. 
91. Gabel, supra note 68. 
92. See Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985 (1990). 
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Feminist methodology can redefine the arguments for 
autonomy: first, autonomy has intrinsic value both in recog-
nizing the subjectivity of individual experience and the impor-
tance of agency. Second, rights analysis should not be totally 
dismissed as it may provide important protection for the sub-
ordinate group as it struggles to assert its identity. And, 
finally, claims of ideological determinism by radical feminists 
such as MacKinnon are counterproductive to her own goal of 
freedom from domination since they interfere with the devel-
opment of autonomy. I do not simply adopt a defense of liber-
al political theory; my idea of autonomy is grounded in the 
transformative lessons of feminism. 
B. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF AUTONOMY 
First, autonomy is ultimately the capacity of a person to 
choose freely the direction of her life.93 As ail aspect of liberal 
theory, it has intrinsic value in the concept of liberty, though 
it has been distinguished from freedom in that it implies an 
aspect of inner direction, not merely the absence of constraint 
on choice of activity. 94 
For an individual to develop an inner direction, she must 
be in touch with her 'authentic self.J95 The authentic self is the 
subjective experience, truly understood. It is here that femi-
nist methodology can help construct (reconstruct?) subjectiv-
ity, through the experience of consciousness-raising, context 
and narrative.96 Robin West says: 
As we become more aware of the presence of 
patriarchal power, we become more aware of 
93. RAz, supra note 79, at Chapter 14. 
94. Waldron, supra note 79, at 1103-08. 
95. The notion of an "authentic self" appears frequently in feminist theory, 
defined in different ways. Ruth Colker sees it as "some intuitive sense of each of our 
human possibilities." Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary 
Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U.L. REV. 217, 221 (1988). She recognizes 
that feminist theory, particularly that of MacKinnon, tends to focus on externalities 
"rather than internal changes in consciousness." Id. at 218. Gloria Steinem focuses 
on the development of self esteem in individual women as essential to the success of 
a feminist movement. GLORIA STEINEM, REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN (1992). 
However, for Nancy Chodorow, whose feminist writings center upon the selfs 
development ofindividuality through its connection to the mother, it is explicitly linked 
to psychoanalytic insight of object-relations theory "[ whichl conceptualizes the self as 
inexorably social and intrinsciaUy connected." NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND 
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 158-59 (1989). 
96. See, e.g., Christine Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method 
Makes (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REV. 751, 782-84 (1989) ("[Tlhe experience of 
shared experience ... is what constructs women as an oppositional class"). 
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that which is within us-whether or not we 
decide to call it a "self'-and of that which 
is vulnerable to patriarchy's terrible destruc-
tivity .... Through consciousness-raising, 
women come to reclaim a self that is with-
in .... The critical female self knows herself as 
a fantastic, unlived, unspeakable, unspo-
ken alternative which cannot render itself 
more concrete, and which is known in large 
part through its absence from cultured life.97 
597 
Because West believes that it is primarily a lack of self 
which is reinforced by existing social constructs, she rejects crit-
icallegal theory's regeneration of an unalienated self. West 
draws on MacKinnon's idea of the "giving self' (who may give 
to avoid male violence), Chodorow's idea of "connectedness" 
through a girl's identification with her mother and her own the-
ory of the centrality of reproduction in women's lives to con-
struct a feminist self-identity.98 It is her attempt to define the 
inner direction that shapes women's lives that helps to create 
a respect for autonomy different from that of classical liberal 
thought. 
1. Subjectivity 
Feminism's rallying cry of the "personal is the political" is 
central to its focus on the discussion of shared experience. 
Ironically, when feminists attempt to advance the discussion 
toward personal growth, they are dismissed and marginal-
ized as fixating on personal issues.99 However, relation of 
subjective experience through consciousness raising or nar-
rative or other group methods, can contribute to a political 
definition of autonomy. 
Ann Freedman explicitly links "serious work on personal 
issues as part of(and not a substitute for) collective efforts to 
make change."loo She attributes, for example, her failure to 
renounce discriminatory tenure and appointments problems at 
her law school to the "lifetime in a sexist culture in which my 
97. Robin West. Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 59, 88. 
98. [d. 
99. See. e.g., STEINEM, supra note 95. 
100. Ann E. Freedman. Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism. 
Sexism and Homophobia in Law School. 24 GA. L. REV. 849, 853-58 (1990) (describ-
ing her personal experience with internalized sexism and a program for change). 
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self esteem and sense of entitlement have been continually 
undermined." To recover a sense of empowerment, she notes 
that "the false equation of self-love with greed and selfishness 
must be challenged."lol (MacKinnon, on the other hand, says 
"Since when is politics therapy?"103) Freedman's story shows 
that even the privileged among us experience powerless-
ness from sexism in ways that seriously interfere with our 
autonomy. 
To the extent that autonomy focuses on the subjective 
experience of the individual it values the inner direction and 
sense of the person. And, paired with the feminist methodol-
ogy of consciousness raising, reflections on subjective experi-
ence help to define and delineate collective notions of 
realization and empowerment.103 Since the effect of sexist or 
patriarchical experience in our culture is to demean, marginal-
ize and subordinate women, it seems necessary to undo that 
damage, to rekindle the individual sense of self-worth before 
undertaking the dismantling of the cultural constructs. It is 
difficult to see how the collective experience can fuel movement 
toward change without attainment of autonomy for individu-
al women. In response to MacKinnon, work in therapy can cer-
tainly affect individuals, but an effective collective strategy for 
raising and articulating individual experiences of marginal-
ization will contribute toward growth and true autonomy.104 
2. Agency 
Agency, by which I mean self-determination, is another 
aspect of autonomy to be valued intrinsically. However, 
women's capacity for self-determination is hindered by the 
experience of gender. First, women as a group lack equal 
access to the economic conditions which will support autono-
my.IOG As Pat Cain puts it, "[T]he goal of feminism is to achieve 
sufficient changes in the material conditions of women's lives 
so they can create themselves as freely and authentically as 
men. "108 There must be a minimum fulfillment of basic needs 
before the capacity for autonomy can be exercised. 107 Women are 
101. 1d. at 857. 
102. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 40, at 220. 
103. Littleton, supra note 96. 
104. Freedman, supra note 100. 
105. Williams, supra note 33. 
106. Cain, The Limits of Equality, supra note 25, at 826. 
107. RAz, supra note 79, at 373-76; Waldron. supra note 79. at 1108-09. 
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economically disadvantaged through divorce, single parent-
hood, pregnancy, pay disparity, promotion and because of their 
obligations to the families and have trouble supporting the 
capacity for autonomy. 
Second, Kathryn Abrams supports the feminist argument 
for agency from the perspective of women as rational deci-
sion makers. She articulates the importance of women having 
the true capacity for free choice and fears that ideological 
determinism, such as MacKinnon's dominance theory, will 
encourage scrutiny of women's personal choices and detract 
from women's ability to make meaningful individual deci-
sions. In the areas of choice within the abortion decision and 
the decision to leave the workplace during parenting, she 
notes that women labor under a stereotype of doubts about their 
capacity for making meaningful choices and that these doubts 
have "fueled the opposition to women's equality. "108 
C. THE CONTINUING UTILITY OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS 
In contrast to critical legal scholars, feminist theorists 
find liberal rights analysis useful in ways which impact upon 
the connection of the individual to the community. Whereas lib-
eral theory protects the individual through legal rights, fem-
inist theory transforms rights discourse to account for the 
individual woman's perspective, which then affects the defi-
nition of the right and its consequences for the collectivity. 
Patricia Williams, for example, comments in the context of 
African-American rights: "Although rights may not be ends in 
themselves, rights rhetoric has been and continues to be an 
effective form of discourse for blacks. The vocabulary of rights 
speaks to an establishment that values the guise of stability, 
and from whom social change for the better must come (whether 
it is given, taken, or smuggled). "109 "[T]he goal is to find a 
political mechanism that can confront the denial of need."110 
"The task .. .is not to discard rights but to see through or past 
them so that they reflect a larger definition of privacy and prop-
erty: so that privacy is turned from exclusion based on self 
regard into regard for another's fragile, mysterious autonomy; 
108. Abrams, supra note 77, at 779-83. See also Williams, supra note 33. 
109. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 149 (1989). Compare 
the discussion in Williams with CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAw, 144-
59 (1987); MINOW, supra note 22, at Chapter 6; Rhode, supra note 25,at 632-35. 
110. Williams, supra note 109, at 152. 
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and so that property regains its ancient connotation of being 
a reflection of the universal self. "111 
Williams exquisitely balances the problems of the real 
world in which she feels dis empowered and her vision of the 
world to work for: where "society must give [rights] away ... Give 
to all of society's objects and untouchables the rights of privacy, 
integrity and self assertion; give them distance and respect. 
Flood them with the animating spirit that rights mythology 
fires in this country's most oppressed psyches, and wash away 
the shrouds of inanimate-object status, so that we may say not 
that we own gold but that a luminous golden spirit owns us. "112 
Elizabeth Schneider proposes a resolution to the rights prob-
lem: that it be used to establish a dialogue to bridge theory 
and practice. us Her recognition of the reality of legal practice 
demonstrates the transformative potential of rights which are 
utilized, not merely to enforce the status quo, but to define 
areas of protection for the oppressed. Schneider argues for an 
Hegelian interaction in which the politics of the collective move-
ment is energized and enhanced by the necessity of developing 
legal theories of rights: "The articulation of women's rights pro-
vides a sense of self and distinction for individual women, while 
at the same time giving women an important sense of collective 
identity .... they also actively shape public discourse."114 While 
recognizing criticism from the feminist critical theorists that 
rights convert real political goals into abstract, neutral claims, 
Schneider argues that "these claims, articulated in the lan-
guage of rights, have advanced the political development and 
organizing potential of the movement, and expanded and con-
cretized the consciousness of feminist activists and litigators."115 
Schneider examines conflicts among feminists regarding 
legal rights solutions to items on the feminist agenda: repro-
ductive freedom, pregnancy leave, pornography, sexual harass-
ment and battering. She argues that articulation of legal 
theories of rights, in each case, "illuminated broader political 
perceptions of patriarchy and sexual subordination"116 and, in 
effect, started the conversation within and without the legal 
forum for political change. 
lll. ld. at 164. 
ll2. ld. at 165. 
ll3. Schneider, supra note 65. 
ll4. ld. at 625. 
ll5. ld. at 640. 
ll6. ld. at 650. 
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Schneider sees rights analysis as benefiting both individ-
ual women and women as a class because of the potential for 
political transformation. She does acknowledge the perception 
that "an equal rights perspective only affords individual women 
access to treatment as males," but she believes "the source of 
the claims, women's experience, modifie[s] the substance of the 
claims themselves."117 She argues for an ongoing dialectic in 
which both the creative aspects of rights claims and a critical 
stance toward rights contribute to political strategy for the 
movement as a whole. u8 
A different problem in relying on rights analysis through 
definition of abstract legal rights is presented by those who cri-
tique an essentialist feminism. While the critical theorists see 
rights as indeterminate, capable of manipulation by the legal 
establishment, and therefore both unhelpful in securing true 
equality and contributing to continued reliance on an illegit-
imate system, the critique from the anti-essentialist perspec-
tive sees the difficulty in arriving at anyone clear articulation 
of a legal right to secure advantages for all women. 
A response to this critique is to encourage a multiplicity of 
perspectives from which to engage in rights discourse. A dif-
ferent perspective views rights, not as abstract notions of 
legal entitlement, but as 'practices'. Adelaide Villmoare pro-
poses listening carefully to women, not just lawyers, who, in the 
context of their daily experience, rely on rights discourse, cre-
ating the potential for "articulating liberatory visions or more 
immediate political and social alternatives. "U9 Villmoare char-
acterizes these critical perspectives as a postmodern approach: 
"[they] respect the partiality of interpretation and develop 
understandings of phenomena as practices within local con-
texts. And they seek out multiplicities of experiences where dif-
ferences and distinctions assume notable significance. "120 She 
proposes a focus on the context of women's actual experience 
to define what rights women claim and argues that this method 
helps constitute women's self-identity.121 Anti-essentialist fem-
inism and postmodernism both accept the multiplicity of 
women's experience; reliance on rights analysis in the context 
117. Id. at 639-42. 
118. Id. at 640. 
119. Adelaide H. Villmoare, Women, Differences and Rights as Practices: An 
Interpretive Essay and a Proposal, 25 LAW & SOC'y REV. 385, 392 (1991). 
120. Id. at 400. 
121. Id. at 402-03. 
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of differences among women helps to construct, not a univer-
sal, abstract theory of rights, but a link between individual 
women's experience and feminist "law, politics and research. "122 
Rights analysis in feminist legal thought reflects the richness 
of these arguments. First, there is the recognition that rights 
are not a luxury for those oppressed by a dominant legal system. 
Then, the notion that the articulation oflegal rights fuels ideas 
about political movements. Finally, insistence on the integra-
tion of women's experience or practice to understand the deriva-
tion of rights resists the universality of abstract legal claims. 
D. FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS, COLLABORATION AND DENIAL 
My final argument for autonomy stems from my discomfort 
with the structural argument that claims women are so dom-
inated by the gender construct that they cannot make free 
choices about the path of their lives. The primary proponent 
of the argument is MacKinnon,123 but Robin West also agrees. 124 
Kathryn Abrams terms this "ideological determinism" and 
suggests that it might show an ultimate disrespect for indi-
vidual women and a devaluation of their own experience.126 
MacKinnon and West both understand gender as a social con-
struction and argue that there is no self apart from that which 
is socially determined. MacKinnon, for example, believes that 
women, collectively oppressed under male domination, cannot 
freely choose their lives, even if they say their choices are freely 
made.126 She borrows from Marxist analysis to claim that women 
experience false consciousness if they do not understand the full 
implications of the reasons for their lack of true autonomy. 
MacKinnon has been criticized by other feminist writers for 
this position. 127 Ironically, her prescription for change, to the 
extent that she offers one, involves consciousness raising,128 a 
way of exploring the destructive effects of oppression by men 
through the sharing of women's experience. While conscious-
ness raising can have political impact, it also is a means of self-
realization, a path toward individual choice and autonomy. 
122. Id. at 406. 
123. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 103. 
124. West, supra note 97. 
125. Abrams, supra note 77, at 774·75. 
126. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at 124. 
127. SMART, supra note 109, at 77·81; Weisbrod, supra note 92, at 993 n.38. 
128. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 40, at Chapter 5. 
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Joan Williams reports a slightly different story: that of 
the internalization by women of social norms created by men. 129 
Ultimately, this results in what Robin West calls denial of 
women's true selves.13o 
West feels women "distinctively bear the mark of patriar-
chal power by denying rather than acting upon ... their pleasures 
and internalizing and identifying with rather than avoiding 
their pains .. .if patriarchy has affirmatively created a social 
existence for women, it is one of objecthood, or otherhood, but 
most assuredly not selfhood. "131 
These arguments about false consciousness and denial 
portray women as incapable of an autonomy of self. They are 
seen as passive victims of male domination so pervasively 
embedded in the culture that women are not aware of its 
effects, and, in fact, have internalized patriarchy's agenda. As 
Abrams notes, these claims can be counterproductive to both 
the falsely conscious victim and others in society listening to 
the claim. 132 The problem is that acceptance of this view denies 
even the existence of a capacity to create a feminist explana-
tion for theory. 133 
MacKinnon's account goes further. In defending her pro-
posed ordinance remediating victims of pornography against 
attacks by liberal feminist lawyers on privacy and first amend-
ment grounds, MacKinnon calls them "collaborators." She 
argues that: 
[W]e were let into this profession on the 
implicit condition that we would enforce the 
real rules: women kept out and down, 
sexual access to women enforced. These 
remain the rules whether you are in and 
up, and whether you practice it or have it 
practiced on you. It keeps the value of the 
most exceptional women high to keep other 
women out and down and on their backs 
with their legs spread ... What law school 
does for you is this: it tells you that to 
129. Williams, Bupra note 33. 
130. West, Bupra note 97, at 87·89. 
131. [d. at 88. 
132. Abrams, Bupra note 77. 
133. Weisbrod, Bupra note 92. 
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become a lawyer means to forget your feel-
ings, forget your community, most of all, if 
you are a woman, forget your experience. 1M 
Abrams discusses the reasons why MacKinnon's 'categorical 
discourse' may need to use the polemical form as a political 
strategy.l36 I fear that MacKinnon's image of women lawyers is 
as exaggerated as it is powerful. Because it is demeaning to all 
women, it is a strange way to build a political movement or to 
encourage women to join the battle. It reduces all women to the 
centrality of their sexuality (MacKinnon's main point) and 
their complicity with male domination if they fail to support her 
program. 
And, of course, it suggests that they are not truly autonomous, 
capable of supporting or refusing to support an issue on princi-
pled grounds, further marginalizing their views. The centrality 
of women's sexual use and abuse by men as the key description 
of gender domination may obscure potential development of 
other issues in feminist thought. Yet what seems so wrong about 
MacKinnon's argument is its lack of respect for the self-deter-
mination and autonomy of those she addresses. 
Autonomy can be a transformative concept, as Nedlesky 
points out. 136 While the classic liberal concept of the individ-
ual does not seem full enough to account for women's differing 
vision for a society,137 the core values of autonomy (subjectivi-
ty, agency, self- determination) seem necessary for creation of 
freedom from subordination. If feminism is serious about 
women's relation of their subjective experience through nar-
rative and contextual analysis, it must get equally serious 
about confronting and affirming the development of a trans-
formative concept of autonomy. 
II. COMMUNITY IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 
Liberal legal thought attempts to counter the critique of 
selfish individualism by situating the self in a community of 
134. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, Bupra note 40, at 205. 
135. Abrams, Bupra note 77, at 770-74. Angela Harris used the term categorical 
discourse in reviewing MacKinnon's work to describe argument which is, ultimately, 
reductionist. Angela Harris, Categorical DiBcourBe and Dominance Theory (Book 
Review), 5 BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 181 (1990). 
136. Nedelsky, supra note 65. 
137. But see Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 
in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 1990) for the argument that 
JOHN RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972) is consistent with a feminist vision. 
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interests. Michael Sandel, a proponent of this view, argues that 
our "constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider 
subject than the individual alone ... [ with] a common vocabulary 
of discourse and a background of implicit practices and under-
standings within which the opacity of the participants is 
reduced if never finally dissolved. »I38 While Sandel envisions 
the melting of the "otherness" of the individual, the cultural 
feminists see a stark opposition by relating the dichotomy of 
individual/community to that of male/female.139 
As Iris Marion Young describes liberal thought: "The cul-
ture identifies masculinity with the values associated with indi-
vidualism - self-sufficiency, competition, separation, the formal 
equality of rights. The culture identifies femininity, on the 
other hand, with community - affective relations of care, mutu-
al aid and cooperation. "140 Women are seen as nurturant, giv-
ing beings, drawn naturally to communities to express their 
ethic of care. 141 For example, Robin West describes a woman's 
use of her power over an infant as emphatically not one ofhier-
archy or domination but one of care. She argues that women 
can therefore imagine a different, non-hegemonic way of rei at-
ing. 142 Annette Baier, focusing on the development of trust 
between human beings, similarly postulates a theory of fem-
inist morality directly opposite to the [male] arms-length con-
tractarian model, one which allows for inequality of power 
and a natural connection to others.143 
The ethic of care set out by Carol Gilligan is often cited as 
an example of women's distinctly different approach toward 
communitarian models. Yet there has been surprisingly little 
development of exactly what a community defined by a femi-
nist vision would look like. One of the reasons, I suspect, is that 
it is difficult to generalize about a homogeneity of interests 
without tripping the anti-essentialist critique. If there is no 
essential constitution of Woman, the content of the com-
munity's values is unclear. And the critique has been power-
138. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 147·53 (1982). 
Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael 
Sandel ed., 1984). 
139. Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, 
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 21, at 300. 
140: Id. at 306. . 
141. Id. 
142. West, supra note 97, at 80. 
143. Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, in FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra 
note 137, at 279. 
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ful. The cultural feminists are left describing a vision of coop-
eration which is so general as to be meaningless. 
For example, Wendy Kaminer argues that concern for com-
munity is basic to feminism. It is "a belief that what women 
share is character-the capacity to 'care' and compromise and 
make peace . . . they share a past-of economic powerless-
ness, dependence and vulnerability to sexual abuse, of child 
rearing, homemaking and community service. The irony for 
feminists is that the separate women's world created by dis-
crimination and traditional divisions of labor have always 
been a source of strength for women as well as a fount offrus-
tration. "144 But these generalizations are not necessarily uni-
versal nor do they lead to a positive concept of community. 
Marilyn Friedman explores the limits of the 'social self,' 
which both contributes to self-identity and gives meaning to 
individual lives. 146 She finds this self engaged in a redefinition 
of community, one based on the ethics of care. Yet she cautions 
that a community premised on family, religion or neighborhood 
can be constraining because it imposes moral claims upon its 
members. As she points out, many communities (churches, for 
instance) have a long history of gender domination and oppres-
sion which impact on women, doubly so if women honor the 
moral claims made. 146 Friedman ends up proposing freely cho-
sen communities, rather than ones in which the self and iden-
tity are embedded. The example she gives is of the city, where 
women can be free from the gender roles imposed on them by 
their families, neighborhoods, and religious institutions. 147 
Her pre~cription for a feminist version of community ends up 
looking much like the vision of autonomy proposed above. 
In her critique of individualism, Fox-Genovese argues for 
using "the proud vocabulary of shared pain" between men and 
women as a basis for confronting a commitment to social jus-
tice, rather than looking toward women's subjective experience, 
which is one of oppression. 146 "Above all, we are groping toward 
144. WENDY KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN'S FLIGHT FROM EQUALITY 
(1990). 
145. Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship, in FEMINISM AND 
POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 137, at 143. 
146. [d. at 147. 
147. [d. at 155. 
148. FOX-GENoVESE, supra note 2, at 240, 234. Her critique of individualism in 
the feminist movement is premised on a return to community. 
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an understanding of all individuals as hostage to the collec-
tivities to which they belong and which alone give their iden-
tities meaning."149 Fox-Genovese argues that adherence to 
individualism has ended up disadvantaging women who had 
previously been cared for by social institutions, such as mar-
riage, leaving them with the cruel idea of individualism but no 
valid support.160 "Feminism, as the daughter of women's exclu-
sion, understands that social opportunity must lie in access to 
the various roles that society offers."161 She concludes that 
reconceiving the nature of community is crucial. Because "dif-
ference lies at the core of our humanity," gender relations 
must be subject to constant reinterpretation for society to 
understand the consequences of difference. 162 
The idea that the concept of community is a "set of shared 
understandings located in the self'163 also tends to dissolve the 
dichotomy of individual/community, "thus generat[ing] a dialec-
tic in which each is a condition for the other. "164 The dissolu-
tion of the dichotomy of individual/community is the 
postmodern ideal. Nedelsky expresses a related idea when 
she sees autonomy as dependent on links to the community for 
its definition; that autonomy is enhanced by interaction with 
the community rather than by respect for boundaries, creat-
ing the potential for both freer individuals and a stronger, 
more integrated community.166 
But if the idea of community is premised on shared under-
standings or values, the danger is that the community will need 
to be homogeneous to reach agreement. As the criteria to 
find agreement are narrowed, the group thus constituted will 
exclude more than it will include. While this coming together 
to reinforce identity is a powerful alternative to alienation in 
the society as a whole, it validates exclusion as a principle and 
draws attention away from common ground between groupS.166 
149. [d. at 240. Although she acknowledges Friedman's argument that commu-
nities have historically oppressed women, she persists in her critique of feminist the-
ory which seeks to free women from their related institutions. In this way, she and 
Friedman are at opposite poles. 
150. [d. at Chapter 2. 
151. [d. at 241. 
152. [d. at 238. 
153. Steven Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 963, 1002 (1991). 
154. Young, supra note 139, at 307. 
155. Nedelsky, supra note 65. 
156. See Ilene Philipson, What's the Big J.D.? The Politics of the Authentic Self, 
TIKKUN, Nov.lDec. 1991, at 51. 
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Worse, to the extent that the 'authentic self' is defined by 
identification with the group, the process of Balkanization 
may also result in the shattering of the self.167 Young argues 
that a post-modern sensibility would, instead, recognize and 
accept difference and reject exclusion on the grounds of homo-
geneity.168 
It is in the post-modern position exemplified by Young that 
we begin to see the contingency of the individual within the 
community. The post-modern position rejects anyone clear def-
inition of community in favor of a "transformative program" 
comprised of "healthy debate, respectful disagreement, and con-
tinual reappraisal. "169 Process once again transcends any uni-
tary vision of a just society. Feminist thought has contributed 
much to this dialectic by insisting on the primacy of the sub-
jective experience of women and by developing the critique of 
liberalism through the recognition of difference. 
We now need to redefine both autonomy (to create strong 
authentic selves) and community (to establish a freely chosen, 
shared construct). It is the project for the next stage of femi-
nist legal thought. 
III. AFTERWORD 
This essay presents an argument for autonomy that is 
transformative. I conclude that it is much easier to construct 
a theory of autonomy than to describe a feminist vision of 
community which does not sound superficial or oppressive. I am 
convinced that feminist thought and the process of shared 
experience are dynamically situated to propose alternatives as 
the opacity between individual and community dissolves. 
But I share Martha Fineman's concern that feminist legal 
thought "seems unanchored." Or more particularly, it seems 
anchored in many different directions: "[i]t drifts between the 
extremes of 'grand theory,' which is totalizing in its scope and 
ambitions, and personal narratives, which begin and end with 
the presentation of one individual's unique experience. "160 
With the failure of grand theory to capture the spirit of the 
157. Id. at 55. 
158. Young, supra note 139, at 312. 
159. Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (1s There Politics After 
Postmodernism7) (Book Review), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549,61 (1991). 
160. Fineman, supra note 12, at 25. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/2
1992] FEMnrrSTLEGALTHOUGHT 609 
movement and the attack on essentialism which deterred the 
exploration of common ground among women in favor of pre-
sentation of differences, she argues that "[t]his disunity 
impedes the aggregation of power necessary for women of all 
groups to push back the barriers exluding most of us and our 
experiences. "161 
My own support for a reconceived autonomy stems from the 
sense I have about the level of energy needed to push back the 
barriers. That energy needs to be grounded both in a solid 
sense of judgment about ultimate social values and strong 
self identity. In fact, the very questions that are impacted at 
the juncture of autonomy and community. 
161. Id. at 40. 
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